For this week’s installment (woefully late) I am going to dive into the depths of the philosophy of mind. Namely I will be arguing against minds, at least as they have been conceived by many thinkers in the past. To that effect I will start with philosophical zombies.
Zombies were introduced into the philosophy of mind in the 1970’s (e.g. Nagel 1970, Kirk 1974) as an argument against materialism. Current debates on zombies, however, stem from David Chalmers’ detailed exposition of the argument (Chalmers 1996). A simple definition of zombies can be given as follows:
- Zombie: A creature that resembles a human person […] in all physical and behavioral respects but lacks qualia (Kirk 2011).
From this definition it follows that it is not like anything to be a zombie. And what is a quale (pl. qualia), one might ask? Qualia are…
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